Author: Tucker, Jonathan B.
Title: Trafficking Networks for Chemical Weapons Precursors: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq Was of the 1980s
Summary: States seeking to produce chemical weapons (CW) typically rely on the importation of intermediate chemicals called "precursors," which have legitimate industrial applications but can also be converted into military-grade CW agents. Until recently, little open-source information was available about illicit trafficking networks for CW precursors. This study draws on two case studies to present relevant information about the methods of illicit trafficking of these chemicals. In addition, it describes the current U.S. system of dual-use export controls, indicates how it has changed since the 1980s, and identifies continuing gaps and weaknesses.
Details: Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2008. 40p.
Source: Occasional Paper No. 13
Year: 2008
Country: United States
URL:
Shelf Number: 116207
Keywords:
Nuclear TerrorismNuclear WeaponsTrafficking of Nuclear Materials |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office
Title: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative Faces Funding and Sustainability Challenges
Summary: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Megaports Initiative in 2003 to deter, detect, and interdict nuclear or other radiological materials smuggled through foreign seaports. The Initiative funds the installation of radiation detection equipment at select seaports overseas and trains foreign personnel to use this equipment to scan shipping containers entering and leaving these seaports - regardless of destination. NNSA provides partner countries with maintenance and technical support for about 3 years, after which it transfers the equipment and all related responsibilities to partner countries. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of the Megaports Initiative and NNSA's plans for completing and sustaining it and (2) the benefits of the Initiative and factors that reduce its effectiveness. GAO analyzed key documents; interviewed agency officials; and visited eight Megaports in five countries, selected on the basis of port size and unique characteristics, among other things. GAO recommends that NNSA take actions, including (1) finalizing its long-term plan for ensuring the sustainability of Megaports operations after NNSA's final transfer of equipment to partner countries and (2) developing and maintaining useful and reliable measures to assess the performance of the Initiative. GAO also recommends that NNSA and DHS jointly assess the extent to which the two Initiatives are effectively coordinating. NNSA and DHS agreed with GAO's recommendations.
Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 71p.
Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-37: Accessed December 7, 2012 at:
Year: 2012
Country: United States
URL:
Shelf Number: 127143
Keywords:
Maritime SecurityNuclear SmugglingNuclear WeaponsPort SecurityWeapons of Mass Destruction |
